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Abstract 
This paper compares the performance of foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms, using 
micro data on Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector for the period 1994–2000. The overall 
comparison between foreign-owned and Japanese companies shows that foreign-owned companies 
enjoyed 5% higher TFP as well as higher earnings and returns on capital.  They also displayed a 
higher capital-labor ratio and higher R&D intensity. Reflecting their higher TFP and labor-saving 
production patterns, foreign-owned companies showed higher labor productivity and wage rates as 
well.    By estimating Probit models, we found that foreign firms acquire Japanese firms with higher 
TFP levels and higher profit rates. In contrast, in-in M&As seem to have the characteristics of rescue 
missions. Small firms with a higher total liability/total asset ratio tend to be chosen as targets of in-in 
M&As.  We also estimated the dynamic effects of M&As on target firms. The results indicate that 
out-in M&As improve target firms’ TFP level and current profit/sales ratio. Compared with in-in 
M&As, out-in M&As bring a larger and quicker improvement in TFP and the profit rate but no 
increase in target firms’ employment two years after the acquisition. 
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1. Introduction 
Though the Japanese economy finally seems to be recovering after having stagnated since the 
early 1990s, many of the underlying problems remain. In order to accelerate structural adjustments 
and achieve a full-scale economic recovery, the Japanese government has therefore launched various 
policy packages, including the promotion of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). According to 
economic theory, FDI is a form of long-term international capital movement which is accompanied 
by investors’ intangible assets (such as the accumulated technological knowledge through R&D or 
marketing know-how based on past advertising activity) and it is expected that the recipient country 
will benefit from such inflows.
1 Although FDI traditionally has not been considered economically 
important for Japan because it is the world’s largest trade surplus country, the potential benefits of 
FDI and the contribution it can make to Japan’s economy in the areas of employment, demand, 
capital investment, and productivity have recently gained attention. In his general policy speech to 
the Diet on January 31, 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi promised to increase efforts to 
attract inward FDI with the aim of doubling the cumulative amount of investment within the next 
five years. Although foreign investment in Japan has increased rapidly in the past few years, the FDI 
stock is still very small when compared with that in other developed economies. 
Despite the importance of the topic, reliable statistics on and analyses of inward FDI in Japan 
are very limited. Moreover, in the absence of any meaningful empirical studies on the subject, some 
observers have argued that Japan does not need more FDI (Werner 2003; Nihon Keizai Shinbun 
2003). Like FDI in other developed economies, the largest part of recent inflows to Japan took the 
form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The critics fear that inward M&As are dominated by 
“vulture” funds seeking to reap quick profits by taking advantage of troubled firms (Nihon Keizai 
                                                  
1 See, for example, Caves (1982) and Dunning (1992) on the standard theory of foreign direct 
investment.  2
Shinbun 2003). Another argument is that some inward M&As are in fact aimed at acquiring 
advanced technologies (Werner 2003) rather than transferring and employing intangible assets in 
Japan. However, according to quantitative studies on corporate performance in Japan, such as Fukao 
and Murakami (2003), Kimura and Kiyota (2003), and Murakami and Fukao (2003), foreign-owned 
firms tend to show higher productivity than domestically-owned firms in Japan. If foreign-owned 
firms are performing better than domestic ones, one would expect that the Japanese economy overall 
will benefit from more inward FDI. Foreign firms’ financial resources and know-how could help 
struggling Japanese firms out of financial and management difficulties; and domestically-owned 
firms’ economic performance may be improved by technological spillovers from foreign-owned 
firms and/or intensified competition in the market. 
This paper aims to examine whether concerns such as those about a “technological drain” 
have any foundation or whether Japan does indeed benefit from the transfer of foreign firms’ 
intangible assets. To this end, we compare the performance of foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms, using micro data on Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector for the 
period 1994–2000. Our method of investigation is based on the following reasoning: if 
foreign-owned firms in Japan possess technologies that are superior to those of their 
domestically-owned counterparts, then this should manifest itself in higher total factor productivity 
(TFP). In this case, Japan benefits from inward FDI. There is, of course, the possibility that 
foreign-owned firms may enjoy greater productivity because foreign firms pick firms with higher 
TFP as M&A targets. In order to take account of this possibility, we also test whether foreigners have 
tended to acquire firms that already enjoy higher TFP, or whether the acquired firms’ productivity 
improved after the take-over. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents an overview of recent inward FDI 
trends in Japan using newly constructed statistics by detailed industry; section 3 compares the  3
performance of foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms; section 4 tests whether foreign firms 
choose domestically-owned firms with higher TFP as their M&A targets and whether the 
performance of Japanese firms improved after they were acquired by a foreign firm; section 5, 
finally, summarizes our results and considers the policy implications of this study. 
 
2. An Overview of Inward FDI in Japan 
2.1 Recent Trends in Japan’s Inward FDI 
Inward FDI in Japan is extremely low when compared with other countries. Based on Japan’s 
balance of payment statistics, the ratio of the inward FDI stock to GDP in 2000 was only 1.1 
percent.
2 This figure is only one-eleventh of that for the U.S. and one-twenty-eighth of that for the 
U.K., and it is also much smaller than that for neighboring countries such as South Korea and China. 
What is more, inward FDI is far outstripped by Japanese outward investment. And while foreign 
firms make significant contributions to fixed capital formation and employment in other countries, 
this is not the case in Japan: for example, in the manufacturing sector in the U.K. and France, more 
than 30 percent of total fixed asset formation is conducted by foreign-affiliated companies and 
nearly 30 percent of workers are employed by foreign-affiliated companies. Compared with these 
figures, the share of foreign-affiliated firms in capital formation and employment is extremely low in 
Japan.  
In the five years from 1997 to 2002, however, Japan experienced an FDI boom in the newly 
                                                  
2 Currently, capital reserves by foreign-owned firms are not included in the direct investment 
liabilities in Japan’s international investment position statistics. The Ministry of Finance and the 
Bank of Japan are planning to include these in the statistics from the end of 2005. According to 
estimates by the Bank of Japan, this statistical change would raise Japan’s inward FDI stock by 2.9 
trillion yen from 9.4 to 12.3 trillion yen as of the end of 2002. It is to be hoped that the government 
will not claim that Japan has achieved the aim of doubling the cumulative amount of inward FDI 
through the help of this statistical manipulation.  4
deregulated finance/insurance, telecommunications, service, and retail/wholesale industries. In the 
manufacturing sector, the machinery industry (mainly in the automotive field) and the chemical 
industry (mainly in the pharmaceutical sector) also saw strong FDI inflows. However, 72% of the 
investment during this period went into non-manufacturing industries, which is in striking contrast to 
the period from 1950 to 1995, when 54% of all investment went into the manufacturing sector.
3 
According to Japan’s international investment position statistics, the stock of inward FDI in Japan 
rose 2.7-fold to 9.4 trillion yen during the five years from 1997 to 2002.
4, 5, 6  
 
2.2 Japan’s International Transactions by Industry 
In this subsection, we look at Japan’s international transactions—both FDI and cross-border 
trade—at the 2-digit industry level, relying mainly on newly compiled data based on the 
                                                  
3 These industry-level data are based on FDI statistics of Japan’s Ministry of Finance, which is 
gross-based (repayments and withdrawals of funds are not subtracted) and different from the balance 
of payments statistics. 
4 The balance of payments and the international investment position statistics can be downloaded 
from the Bank of Japan web site (www.boj.or.jp) and the Ministry of Finance web site 
(www.mof.go.jp), respectively. We should note that in 1996, the Japanese government introduced a 
new survey on Japan’s international investment position and in accordance with methodological 
changes in the 5th edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual included reinvested earnings of 
foreign-owned firms in the FDI flow and stock statistics. Because of these changes, the statistics 
after 1996 are not directly comparable with those before 1996. 
5 In recent years, globalization has brought a wave of large-scale M&As to Japan, involving 
companies such as AT&T, Cable & Wireless, GE Capital and Ripplewood. M&As in Japan were 
also driven by the growing excess capacity resulting from the prolonged domestic recession, which 
prompted both domestic and foreign investors to choose acquisition over investment in new facilities. 
However, the bust of the IT bubble in the U.S., the Enron scandal, and the Iraq war have taken the 
steam out of the global M&A boom. 
6 From the end of 2002 to the end of 2003, the inward FDI stock in Japan increased by only 2% 
(from 9.4 to 9.6 billion yen). Further large-scale deregulation will be necessary to attract more FDI, 
though such an effort does not appear to be on the government agenda today.    5
Establishment and Enterprise Census for 2001 conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications.
7 These statistics are comparable with 
the inward FDI data for 1996 compiled by Ito and Fukao (2003a; 2003b).
8  
According to Ito and Fukao (2003a; 2003b), Japanese-affiliates of foreign firms (JAFF) with 
33.4% or more foreign ownership employed 485,000 workers in all industries in 1996. Given that 
the total number of domestic workers was 63 million, only 0.77 percent of total domestic workers 
were employed by JAFF at that time. According to our new statistics for 2001, JAFF with 33.4% or 
more foreign ownership employed 756,000 workers in all industries. That is, the number of workers 
employed by JAFF increased by approximately 271,000 workers from 1996 to 2001. The largest 
share of the increase—228,000 out the 271,000 additional workers employed by JAFF—is 
attributable to the service sector. At the same time, the total number of domestic workers decreased 
by more than 2.6 million to 60 million in 2001. Consequently, the share of the number of workers 
employed by JAFF in the total number of domestic workers increased to 1.26 percent in 2001. 
Although this is still very low, it nevertheless represents a substantial increase in the number of 
workers employed by JAFF. 
Table 2.1 shows various measures representing Japan’s international transactions at the 2-digit 
industry level. In the manufacturing sector, the share of the number of workers employed by JAFF in 
the total number of domestic workers increased from 1.36 to 1.97 percent during the period 
1996–2001. The drugs & medicines and motor vehicles & parts sectors show a remarkable increase 
in this share, while the share has not changed much in most of the other industries. On the other hand, 
in the service sector, the share increased from only 0.65 to 1.14 percent. The rise is distributed across 
                                                  
7  Although we originally compiled the data at the 3-digit industry level, due to space constraints we 
only present the more aggregated (2-digit level) statistics in this paper. 
8  Our data compilation follows that in Ito and Fukao (2003a, 2003b), where the methodology of data 
compilation and details on the Census and other FDI statistics for Japan can be found.  6
a large number of industries, such as financial intermediary services and insurance, 
telecommunications & broadcasting, computer programming & information services, other business 
services, and eating and drinking places. This suggests that the presence of JAFF is expanding in 
many different service industries in Japan. 
INSERT Table 2.1 
Another indication of the historically low level of inward FDI and the recent change is 
provided by a comparison of Japan’s inward FDI with its outward FDI (Table 2.1). In the case of the 
manufacturing sector, the imbalance between the activities of JAFF and those of FAJF (foreign 
affiliates of Japanese firms) is substantial. In terms of employment size, the JAFF/FAJF ratio was 
0.095 (=1.36/14.29) in 1996. Assuming that the activities of FAJF in terms of employment remained 
unchanged, the JAFF/FAJF ratio would have been 0.138 (=1.97/14.29) in 2001. In the service sector, 
the imbalance between the activities of JAFF and FAJF is much smaller. In 1996, the JAFF/FAJF 
ratio was 0.344 (=0.65/1.89), and again assuming that the activities of FAJF in terms of employment 
remained unchanged in 2001, this would have increased to 0.603 (=1.14/1.89).   
In the case of the United States, the ratio of the number of workers employed by the U.S. 
affiliates of foreign firms (USAFF) to the total number of domestic workers is about 11% in the 
manufacturing sector and approximately 4% in the service sector. Thus, in both sectors, this ratio is 
much higher than in Japan.
9  Interestingly, however, the ratio did not change much in the U.S. during 
the period from 1992 to 1997, while in Japan the ratio increased 1.4-fold in the manufacturing sector 
and 1.8-fold in the service sector between 1996 and 2001. Nevertheless, at 1.97%, the ratio of 
workers employed by foreign-owned affiliates in Japan’s manufacturing sector in 2001 was still less 
                                                  
9  We should note that the definition of the cut-off capital participation rate differs for Japan and the 
United States. In the case of the U.S. statistics on USAFF, the data include only those affiliates 
where a single foreigner owns 10% or more. On the other hand, in the case of Japan, our data on 
JAFF include all those affiliates where one or several foreigners own 33.4% or more in total.  7
than one-fifth of the corresponding ratio for the U.S. of 10.78%.   
While this represents a large gap, there are good economic reasons why FDI penetration in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector and hence the share of workers employed by foreign affiliates is low. 
In cases where cross-border transactions in goods and services are not difficult, multinational 
corporations will choose the location with the lowest production costs. Because of high wage rates 
and land prices, Japan probably has a locational disadvantage for manufacturing industries except 
those in which proximity to consumers plays an important role.   
In contrast, the low level of inward FDI in Japan’s service sector is a more serious issue. Since 
many services are untradable, Japanese customers cannot enjoy the advanced services foreign firms 
may offer if foreign firms do not establish affiliates in Japan. When compared with the U.S., inward 
FDI in Japan—despite the recent increase—has been limited to a small number of industries in the 
service sector. Some industries, such as medical services, education, and electricity, gas, and water 
supply have been “sanctuaries” where almost no inward FDI has occurred. As we showed in Fukao 
and Ito (2003) and Ito and Fukao (2003a, 2003b), the Japanese economy is still closed in some 
industries such as electricity, gas, transportation, postal services, medical services, health and 
hygiene, etc.
10  
Summarizing the observations above, the number of workers employed by JAFF has increased 
fairly rapidly in recent years, particularly in the service sector, though the share of workers employed 
by JAFF in total domestic workers is still low when compared with the United States. 
 
3.  TFP Comparison of Foreign-Owned and Domestically-Owned Firms 
In this section, we compare the TFP level and other performance indicators of foreign-owned 
                                                  
10 Barriers against FDI often go beyond questions of “national treatment” to more fundamental 
issues of market access. For example, market entry in areas such as medical services and education 
is restricted even for Japanese companies.    8
and domestically-owned firms, using micro data of Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector for 
the period of 1994–2000. Quite a number of studies, on various countries, have dealt with this topic. 
These typically show that labor tends to be more productive in foreign-affiliated companies than in 
domestic companies.
11 However, this is generally due to a greater concentration of capital 
investment; total factor productivity (TFP) analysis indicates that foreign firms’ productivity is not 
necessarily higher if differences in capital intensity are taken into account.
12  
A study that has examined the relationship between ownership and firms’ performance 
indicators (such as the capital-labor ratio, real value-added and TFP) is that by Kimura and Kiyota 
(2003), which used the same data source as the present paper. Covering the period 1994–1998 (fiscal 
years), their study showed that foreign-ownership has a positive impact on the growth rate of real 
value-added, the rate of return to capital, and TFP. Compared with their analysis, our study is more 
sharply focused on the TFP level as a measure of performance and measures TFP using a more 
sophisticated approach. Moreover, this paper examines a longer period (1994–2000) and investigates 
how out-in and in-in M&As affect the performance of invested firms.
13 
                                                  
11  See, for example, Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1998) on Indonesia and Griffith and Simpson (2001) 
on Britain. Doms and Jensen (1998) in their study on the U.S. found that U.S. multinational plants 
had the highest labor productivity, followed by foreign-owned establishments, while U.S.-owned 
non-multinational plants had the lowest labor productivity.” 
12  Studies coming to this conclusion include Ito (2004b) on Indonesia, Ramstetter (2001, 2002) and 
Ito (2002, 2004a) on Thailand, and Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994) on Canada. 
13 The approach used here also tries to deal with the following shortcomings of Kimura and 
Kiyota’s (2003) paper. First, Kimura and Kyota used the book-value of capital as capital inputs. As 
is well known, there may be a huge gap between the book-value of capital and the real capital stock, 
though the latter is more appropriate as input data for TFP analysis. Second, they used value-added 
instead of gross output as their output measure. As Baily (1986) has shown, value-added-based TFP 
may differ from gross-output-based TFP, which is commonly used in theoretical and empirical 
studies. Third, Kimura and Kiyota derived real value-added using the value-added deflator of the 
SNA statistics. However, this deflator is based on a relatively aggregated industry classification, so  9
3.1 Data Source and Definition of Nationality 
We use the firm-level panel data underlying the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure 
and Activities conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
14 The 
survey covers all firms with at least 50 employees or 30 million yen of paid-in capital in the 
Japanese manufacturing, mining and commerce sectors. We use the data for manufacturing firms. 
Our data cover the period 1994–2000 (1994–2001 in the case of the analysis in section 4). After 
some screening of the data our unbalanced panel data consists of 93,880 observations.
15  
In the survey, firms were asked what percentage of their paid-in capital was owned by 
foreigners and whether they had a foreign parent owning more than fifty percent of the firm. Based 
on this information, we determine whether a firm is foreign-owned. We use the following two 
definitions of foreign-owned firms: a broad definition, where one or several foreigners own 33.4% or 
more of the firm’s paid-in capital in total, and a narrow definition, where firms are majority-owned 
by a single foreign firm. It should be noted, though, that there are several Japanese firms, where 
more than one third of issued stocks are owned by foreign institutional investors as portfolio 
                                                                                                                                                  
that their approach risks underestimating the TFP growth of firms in high-tech industries, where 
output prices decline more rapidly. Compared with their approach, we use the more disaggregated 
deflator of Wholesale Price Statistics and Corporate Goods Price Statistics. Fifth, as the benchmark 
for the TFP comparison they used a single hypothetical firm which was derived by taking the 
average of manufacturing firms from all industries. Since the cost shares of each input take quite 
different values among industries, there is a risk of large approximation errors in their approach. We 
use a different hypothetical firm for each industry. 
14 The compilation of the micro-data of the METI survey was conducted as part of the project 
“Foreign Direct Investment in Japan” at the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 
15  We exclude all observations with zero values for material costs, compensation of employees, and 
tangible fixed assets from our data set. We also exclude observations with an extremely high or low 
capital-labor ratio. Through this screening process, the number of observations declined by about 8% 
in comparison with our original set of observations.  10
investments,
16  and there is therefore a risk that our broad definition includes such firms.
17 
 
3.2 “Entry” and “Exit” of Foreign-Owned Firms 
Table 3.1, which is based on our data, shows how the presence of foreign-owned firms in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector increased in 1994–2000. Let us see how the presence of foreign-owned 
firms has expanded, using our broad definition of foreign-owned firms. Their number grew from 195 
in 1994 to 236 in 2000. During the same period, the sales of foreign-owned firms nearly doubled 
from 12.2 trillion yen to 23.7 trillion yen. 62 foreign-owned firms exited and 73 foreign-owned firms 
newly entered in this period.
18  61 domestically-owned firms in 1994 had become foreign-owned by 
2000. We regard these firms as having been acquired by foreign firms.   
INSERT Table 3.1 
The increase in foreign-owned firms’ market share was mainly caused by these 61 M&As. The 
total sales of these 61 firms amounted to 14.1 trillion yen in 2000, which is greater than the total 
increase in foreign-owned firms’ sales of 11.5 trillion yen in the 1994–2000 period. We will examine 
these out-in M&A cases more closely in the following section. 
To sum up the above results, the expansion of the market presence of foreign-owned firms was 
caused primarily through M&As and the growth of incumbents. In comparison, the contribution of 
greenfield investments was negligible. 
                                                  
16 According to the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (2004), the number of Japanese listed firms in which 
foreign institutional investors held more than 40% of issued stocks as portfolio investment increased 
from four at the end of March 2003 to nine at the end of March 2004. 
17 Theoretically, it would be possible to exclude such firms. However, unfortunately we did not 
have access to the firm name list of the METI Survey which would have enabled us to do so. 
18 As already mentioned, the METI survey covers only those firms in the manufacturing and the 
commerce sector that are of a size that is greater than the cut-off level. Thus, our data on firms that 
“entered” includes firms which expanded or changed their main business.  11
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of foreign-owned firms by industry. Foreign-owned firms are 
predominantly found in “high-tech” industries, such as drugs and medicines, other chemical products, 
miscellaneous machinery and machine parts, and electric communication equipment and related 
products. 
INSERT Table 3.2 
 
3.3 Measurement of TFP 
In this paper, we measure each firm’s TFP level using the method developed by Good, Nadiri, 
and Sickles (1997). This method is based on Caves, Christensen, and Diewert’s (1982)   
“hypothetical firm” approach, which measures TFP as the gap between (1) the deviation of a firm’s 
output level from the industry average output level and (2) the summation of the deviations of the 
firm’s input level of production factor i from the industry average input level of that factor multiplied 
by the simple mean of the firm’s cost share of that factor and the industry average cost share of that 
factor for all the production factors. This index is particularly useful for a comparison of the 
productivity level of more than two firms in one particular period. However, this method is not 
suitable for inter-temporal comparisons. 
Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) overcome this problem by combining the “chain index” 
approach with the “hypothetical firm” approach of Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). They 
achieve this by assuming a hypothetical firm for each cross-sectional comparison and then chaining 
the hypothetical firms together over time. The productivity index thus obtained is particularly useful 
because it provides a consistent way of summarizing the cross-sectional distribution of firms’ TFP 
and the intertemporal change of distribution over time. Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997), Fukao and Ito 
(2002), and Hahn (2000) applied this approach to data of the manufacturing sector either at the firm 
level or at the plant level for Taiwan, Japan and Korea, respectively.      12
Using the industry classification of the METI survey, we divided our data into 30 
manufacturing industries. For each industry we measured the TFP level of firm f at time t by 
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where Yft denotes the output level of firm f in year t and Xift represents the input level of factor i at 
firm f in year t. Sift stands for the cost share of input i at firm f in year t. Upper bars indicate the 
average value of that variable over all firms in that industry. 
 
Figure 3.1 compares the histograms of foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms’ TFP. 
This figure shows that foreign-owned firms tend to have substantially higher TFP levels than 
domestically-owned firms. The distributions are based on pooled data and determinants of the TFP 
level other than foreign ownership are not taken into account. Therefore, our interpretation carries 
the risk of being biased. For example, suppose that the average TFP level grows over time and the 
market presence of foreign-owned firms is on the increase. Then foreign-owned firms in pooled data 
tend to have higher TFP than domestically-owned firms even when there is no cross-sectional gap in 
TFP between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms. In order to avoid this kind of bias, we 
conduct a regression analysis. 




3.4 Comparison of Performance by Regression Analysis 
 
We regress firm’s performance on the foreign-ownership dummy and firms’ other 
characteristics. As a first step, we use only the industry and year dummies.
19 
Our main results (using the narrow definition of foreign-owned firms) are as follows (Table 
3.3a). 
INSERT Tables 3.3a and 3.3b 
 
1）  Foreign-owned firms’ TFP is about 8% higher and their current profit-sales ratio 1.5 
percentage points higher.   
2）  Foreign-owned firms enjoy slightly higher TFP growth. 
3）  Foreign-owned firms spend proportionately more on R&D per worker. They also have a 
significantly higher capital-labor ratio. Probably because of this, the labor productivity of 
foreign-owned firms is higher than that of domestically-owned firms. 
4）  There is no significant difference between domestically-owned and foreign-owned firms in 
the growth rates of real sales and employment. But foreign-owned firms show a 
significantly lower growth rate of tangible assets. 
5）  Average wages at foreign firms are 1.28 million yen higher per year. 
 
Using the broad definition of foreign-owned firms (Table 3.3b), we obtain similar results. 
 
 
                                                  
19 In the case of the regression with the TFP level as the dependent variable, we also included a 
cross-term of the year dummy and the industry dummy in order to control for differences in average 
TFP growth rates.  14
3.5 Empirical Model of the Determinants of TFP 
As we have seen, foreign-owned firms tend to conduct more R&D and pay higher wage rates. 
Although their TFP level is significantly higher than that of Japanese firms, this difference might be 
caused not by the inflow of knowledge from their parent firms but by their own R&D activities and 
the (potentially) higher quality of their labor. In order to test which of the above two hypotheses is 
correct, we examine the determinants of each firm’s TFP level and TFP growth rate empirically. 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regression are presented in Table 3.4, while 
the results of this regression are reported in Table 3.5. The regression is conducted using OLS and 
pooled data for 1994–2000. 
INSERT Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
Again, foreign-owned firms display a TFP level about 5% higher than that of Japanese firms 
even after controlling for other factors such as R&D intensity, the percentage of non-production 
workers, years passed since the firm was established, and firm size (sales) in addition to industry 
differences (industry dummies) and observation year (Table 3.5a).   
However, when we add firm dummies to the regression model, the gap between the TFP level 
of foreign-owned firms and Japanese firms becomes insignificant. This result suggests that the 
strong correlation between foreign ownership and the TFP level is at least partly the result of the 
higher TFP level of the firms later acquired by foreign firms. We will study this issue in more detail 
in the next section. 
Table 3.5c shows that the foreign-owned firms has a 1.4–1.8 percentage points higher TFP 
than that of Japanese firms even after controlling for other factors. Yet, this positive correlation 
between foreign ownership and the TFP growth rate again becomes insignificant in the fixed effect 
models. 
Using regional dummies for parent firms’ location, we also tested whether firms owned by  15
U.S. or European firms show a better performance than firms owned by firms from other regions. In 
addition, we tested whether firms majority-owned by foreign firms exhibited a better performance 
than other foreign-owned firms (Table 3.5b and Table 3.5d). We found that firms with a U.S. or a 
European parent show a better performance than firms with parents from other regions. We also 
found that firms majority-owned by foreign firms show a better performance than other 
foreign-owned firms. However, these relationships disappear in the fixed effect models. 
Overall, the comparison between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms in this section 
shows that foreign-owned companies had a 5% higher TFP, and higher returns on capital. Moreover, 
they displayed a higher capital-labor ratio and R&D investment per worker. They also enjoyed a 
higher TFP growth rate. Probably reflecting the higher levels of capital intensity and technology, 
foreign-owned companies showed higher labor productivity and wage rates as well. But in the fixed 
effect models we could not find a significant positive correlation between foreign ownership and the 
TFP level (TFP growth rate).   
 
4.  Selection Model and Dynamic Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions 
As pointed out in the previous section, there are two possible theoretical explanations for the 
positive correlation between foreign ownership and productivity. One potential explanation is that 
foreign-owned firms enjoy greater productivity because foreign firms choose firms with higher TFP 
as their M&A targets. We call this mechanism the selection effect. The alternative explanation is that 
Japanese firms that were acquired by foreign firms receive new technologies and management skills 
from their foreign owners and this transfer of intangible assets boosts their TFP. For short, we call 
this mechanism the technology-transfer effect. 
In order to determine which one of the two effects is responsible for the positive correlation 
between foreign ownership and productivity, we conduct two empirical tests. First, we estimate a  16
Probit model explaining whether a firm is chosen as an M&A target based on its TFP level and other 
characteristics. Second, we test whether the TFP of Japanese firms that were acquired by foreign 
firms improves after the investment.
20 
 
4.1 Data Used 
We use data of manufacturing firms for the years 1994–2001 from the same source as in 
section 3. Following our broad and narrow definition of foreign ownership above, we distinguish 
between firms in which several foreigners acquire 33.4% or more of the equity, and firms in which a 
single foreign firm takes a majority stake. In order to compare out-in M&As with in-in M&As 
(M&As involving only domestic firms), we define in-in M&As as cases where a firm that did not 
have a parent firm with majority ownership in time t–1 comes to have a domestic parent firm with 
majority ownership in time t. This definition of in-in M&As resembles our narrow definition of 
out-in M&As.
21 
Table 4.1 shows the number of out-in and in-in M&A cases in our data. We have 143 cases of 
broadly defined out-in M&As, 67 cases of narrowly defined out-in M&As, and 1,362 cases of in-in 
M&As. 
INSERT Table 4.1 
 
                                                  
20 In many countries, exporting firms tend to a have higher productivity than non-exporting firms. 
Several studies, such as Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Hahn (2004), have tried to discover whether 
exporting improves productivity (learning) and/or whether more productive firms export 
(self-selection). These studies provide important insights that have helped us formulate our approach 
in this section.   
21 Because of data limitations, there are several inconsistencies in our definition of M&As. For 
example, cases where a firm changes its parent firm from one Japanese firm to another Japanese firm 
are not included in our in-in M&As.  17
4.2 Are Good Firms Chosen as M&A Targets?   
Using our panel data of manufacturing firms for 1994–2001, we estimated a Probit model 
explaining whether a firm is chosen as an M&A target based on its TFP level and other 
characteristics. The dependent variables are the broadly defined out-in M&A dummy, the narrowly 
defined out-in M&A dummy, and the in-in M&A dummy. Each M&A dummy variable takes value 
one when this type of M&A occurs. As explanatory variables, we use the logarithm of the TPF level, 
the growth rate of TFP, firm size (the number of workers), the current profit/sales ratio, the total 
liability/total asset ratio, year dummies, and industry dummies. All the explanatory variables are 
values at the period (time t–1) preceding the M&A transaction (time t).  
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results. The determinants of M&As are surprisingly different 
for out-in M&As and in-in M&As. In the case of out-in M&As, firms with higher TFP, a higher 
profit rate, and of a larger size are chosen as targets. In the case of in-in M&As, firms with a lower 
profit rate, larger liabilities, and of a smaller size are chosen as targets. In both cases, the growth rate 
of firms’ TFP (from t-2 to t-1) does not have any significant effect on the selection. 
INSERT Table 4.2 
These results imply that foreign firms acquire Japanese firms that already at the time of 
acquisition show a better performance. It thus seems that at least some part of the higher TFP of 
foreign-owned firms is caused by the selection effect. In contrast, in-in M&As tend to display 
characteristics of rescue measures. One possible explanation is that in-in M&As in Japan are mainly 
conducted within vertical and horizontal keiretsu networks and financially distressed small firms are 
salvaged by other member firms through M&As. 
 
4.3 Does M&A Improve the Performance of Target Firms? 
In this subsection, we examine the technology-transfer effect by estimating how the  18
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where Yf, t denotes the performance of firm f in year t. As Yf, t we use the logarithm of the TFP level, 
the logarithm of the number of workers, and the current profit/sales ratio. It is quite likely that it 
takes several years for technology-transfer effects to manifest themselves and in order to take 
account of this time lag, we study the effects two years (τ=1) and three years (τ=2) after the 
acquisition. As explanatory variables, we use out-in and in-in M&A dummies in year t, the values of 
the three performance variables (the logarithm of the TFP level, the logarithm of the number of 
workers, and the current profit/sales ratio) in year t-1, the R&D/sales ratio, the total liability/total 
sales ratio, industry dummies, and year dummies. In the case of the estimation where changes in 
employment are the dependent variable, we used sales per worker as an additional explanatory 
variable in order to take account of labor hoarding. As out-in M&A dummies, we used both the 
broad and narrow definition of out-in M&A. The narrowly defined M&A dummy takes value one if 
firm f becomes majority-owned by a foreign firm.   
The regression results on the effects two years (τ=1) after the acquisition are reported in Table 
4.3, while the results on the effects three years after (τ=2) are reported in Table 4.4.   
INSERT Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
The results indicate that out-in M&As improve target firms’ TFP level and current profit/sales 
ratio. It seems that out-in M&As where a single foreign firm obtains majority-ownership (the narrow 
definition) tend to have larger and more statistically significant positive effects on these performance 
indicators than out-in M&As where one or more foreign firms do not become majority-owners (the 
broad definition). Compared with out-in M&As, in-in M&As bring a smaller and slower  19
improvement in target firms’ TFP level and there is no improvement in the current profit/sales ratio. 
The impact of out-in M&As on target firms’ employment is also sharply different from that of in-in 
M&As. In the case of in-in M&As, there is a significant and positive effect on employment two 
years after the acquisition, while in the case of out-in M&As, the effect on employment is negative 
but insignificant.   
Overall, we found some evidence showing that target firms’ TFP improved as a result of out-in 
M&As. Compared with in-in M&As, out-in M&As bring a larger and quicker improvement in TFP 
and the profit rate but, at least in the short-run (i.e. two years after the acquisition) do not increase 
employment at the target firms.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
Our analysis of inward FDI has shown that FDI penetration in Japan (as measured by the 
number of workers employed by JAFF in total domestic workers) has increased substantially in 
recent years although the inward FDI penetration still remains low when compared with the United 
States. The increase in FDI penetration in Japan during the period 1996–2001 was more pronounced 
in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. What is more, the growing presence of foreign 
companies was distributed across a wide spectrum of service industries (though important exceptions, 
“sanctuaries,” remain). In the manufacturing sector, the drugs & medicines and motor vehicles & 
parts sectors show a remarkable increase in the share of workers employed by JAFF in total 
domestic workers, while in most other industries this share remained largely unchanged.   
Taking these observations as our point of departure, we investigated the economic 
performance both of foreign-owned and of domestically-owned firms and tried to evaluate whether 
Japan benefits from the transfer of intangible assets of foreign firms.   
The overall comparison between foreign-owned and Japanese companies shows that  20
foreign-owned companies enjoyed 5% higher TFP as well as higher earnings and returns on capital.   
They also displayed a higher capital-labor ratio and higher R&D intensity. Reflecting their higher 
TFP and labor-saving production patterns, foreign-owned companies showed higher labor 
productivity and wage rates as well.   
By estimating Probit models, we found that foreign firms acquire Japanese firms with higher 
TFP levels and higher profit rates. In contrast, in-in M&As seem to have the characteristics of rescue 
missions. Small firms with a higher total liability/total asset ratio tend to be chosen as targets of in-in 
M&As. 
We also estimated the dynamic effects of M&As on target firms. The results indicate that 
out-in M&As improve target firms’ TFP level and current profit/sales ratio. Compared with in-in 
M&As, out-in M&As bring a larger and quicker improvement in TFP and the profit rate but no 
increase in target firms’ employment two years after the acquisition. 
To sum up the above results, we found that both the selection effect and the 
technology-transfer effect play a role in explaining the positive correlation between foreign 
ownership and productivity. The transfer of intangible assets from foreign firms to M&A takeover 
targets represents one important avenue by which Japan can benefit from FDI, and the evidence 
presented here show that such a technology-transfer effect is indeed operating. 
Other potential benefits from FDI include, for example, the various spillover effects associated 
with increased competition and exposure to best global practice that the presence of foreign 
multinationals entails. Such spillovers are likely to be most pronounced in previously sheltered 
sectors of the economy, most of which are to be found in the service sector. The analysis presented 
here, focusing on technology-spillover effects in the manufacturing sector, thus represents only a 
first step in evaluating the impact of out-in M&As, and FDI more generally, on TFP in Japan. 
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Appendix. Definition of Variables Used in the Econometric Analysis and Data Sources 
We used each firm’s total sales and cost of intermediate inputs as nominal gross output and 
nominal intermediate input data. We derived the deflator for each industry’s gross output and 
intermediate input from the Bank of Japan’s Wholesale Price Statistics and Corporate Goods Price 
Statistics. 
For capital stock, the only data available are the nominal book values of tangible fixed assets 
in the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. Using these data, we calculate the 
net capital stock of firm f in industry j in constant 1995 prices as follows: 
) / ( jt jt ft ft IBV INK BV K ∗ =  
where BVft represents the book value of firm f’s tangible fixed capital in year t, INKjt stands for the 
net capital stock of industry j in constant 1995 prices, and IBVjt denotes the book value of industry 
j’s capital. INKjt is calculated as follows. First, as a benchmark, we take the data on the book value of 
tangible fixed assets of year 1976 from the Census of Manufactures 1976 published by METI. We 
then convert the book value of year 1976 into the real value in constant 1995 prices using the net 
fixed assets deflator provided in the Annual Report on National Accounts published by the Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan. Second, the net capital stock of industry j, INKjt, for succeeding years 
is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. We use the capital formation deflator in the 
Annual Report on National Accounts and Matuda’s (2000) estimate of the depreciation rate of 
0.0792 for the calculation. 
In order to obtain capital input, we multiply the net capital stock by the capital utilization ratio 
of each industry, provided in the JIP database.
22  
                                                  
22 The JIP Database was compiled as part of an ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan) research project. The detailed result of this project is reported 
in Fukao, Miyagawa, Kawai, Inui (2004). The database contains annual information on 84 sectors,  22
As labor input, we use each firm’s total number of workers multiplied by the sectoral 
working-hours from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s Monthly Labor Survey. We were 
not able not take account of differences in labor quality among firms, though it seems fair to assume 
that foreign firms probably tend to employ more educated workers. Our estimates of foreign-owned 
firms’ TFP level might be biased upwards as a result of this neglect of the labor quality. 
Finally, we derived the cost shares of the factors of production. For labor cost, we use the 
wage data provided in the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. Intermediate 
input cost is defined as total production cost plus cost of sales and general management minus wages 
minus depreciation. Capital cost is calculated by multiplying the real net capital stock with the user 
















where  τ δ, , ,r q  and z   are the prices of investment goods, interest rates, depreciation rates, 
corporate tax rates, and the present values of depreciation deduction on unit nominal investment, 
respectively. Data on investment goods prices, interest rates, and corporate tax rates were taken from 
the Annual Report on National Accounts and the Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly, and the 
Bank of Japan. The depreciation rate for each industry is estimated using the book value of tangible 
fixed assets at the beginning of year t and depreciation expense during year t in the Census of 
Manufactures published by METI.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
including 49 non-manufacturing sectors, from 1970 to 1998. These sectors cover the whole Japanese 
economy. The database includes detailed information on factor inputs, annual nominal and real 
input-output tables, and some additional statistics, such as R&D stock, capacity utilization rate, 
Japan’s international trade statistics by trade partner, inward and outward FDI, etc., at the detailed 
sectoral level. An Excel file version (in Japanese) of the JIP Database is available on ESRI’s web 
site.  23
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 Table 2.1.  Japan's Inward and Outward FDI
Outward
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Manufacturing Total 1.36 1.97 14.29 11.01 10.78
03 Food products 0.29 0.38 5.17 10.39 8.38
04 Textiles & apparel 0.15 0.18 11.50 4.78 5.83
05 Wood and paper products 0.06 0.17 2.65 4.91 4.95
06 Publishing & printing 0.13 0.25 1.07 6.56 7.83
07 Chemical products 3.61 3.69 30.96 26.91 21.80
08 Drugs & medicines 7.21 15.49 10.04 33.30 31.90
09 Petroleum and coal products 7.24 2.91 2.96 23.69 22.20
10 Plastic products 0.41 0.45 3.91 10.41 10.03
11 Rubber products 1.08 1.18 44.25 23.70 40.18
12 Ceramic, stone and clay 0.28 0.38 11.19 19.76 21.45
13 Iron & steel 0.01 0.14 23.04 19.16 19.35
14 Non-ferrous metals 1.61 0.45 13.20 14.82 15.73
15 Metal products 0.31 0.21 1.90 7.23 7.52
16 General machinery 1.68 1.78 7.98 11.03 12.75
17 Electrical machinery 2.46 2.50 29.96 13.74 13.78
18 Motor vehicles & parts 4.72 10.82 42.05 11.74 15.60
19 Miscellaneous transport equipment 0.70 0.63 6.02 3.43 4.23
20 Precision instruments 0.41 0.91 14.81 14.03 11.16
21 Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.47 0.72 5.65 8.47 6.62
Services Total 0.65 1.14 1.89 4.03 4.31
22 Construction and civil engineering 0.05 0.06 0.70 1.97 1.72
23 Electricity, gas, steam and water supply, e 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.19 1.96
24 Wholesale trade 2.31 2.78 5.85 8.37 7.89
25 Retail trade 0.29 0.51 0.66 3.79 4.50
26 Financial intermediary services 1.47 3.86 13.37 6.62 6.10
27 Insurance 1.67 8.46 5.23 14.34 6.40
28 Real estate 0.02 0.10 1.38 1.97 1.64
29 Transportation & postal service 0.50 0.51 1.52 5.80 4.82
30 Telecommunications & broadcasting 0.22 2.53 0.27 0.62 7.66
31 Education & research institutes 0.34 0.98 0.00 6.44 6.39
32 Medical services, health and hygiene 0.02 0.04 0.01 2.72 1.99
33 Computer programming & information se 1.83 2.92 16.69 4.08 3.88
34 Goods & equipment rental & leasing 0.88 1.21 3.44 5.45 3.66
35 Other business services 0.52 1.64 1.19 4.09 4.77
36 Eating & drinking places 1.58 2.36 0.55 2.71 2.48
37 Other personal services 0.12 0.44 1.14 5.08 4.23
38 Other services 0.01 0.00 0.01 n.a. n.a.
Inward U.S. Inward
Industry





















Sources: Compiled from micro-data of theEstablishment and Enterprise Census for 1996, MITI (1998), Toyo Keiza
Shimpo-sha (1996), and U.S. Department of Commerce (1995a). Also see Appendix.
Note:  FAJF: Foreign Affiliates of Japanese Firms (10% or more Japanese-owned),  JAFF: Japanese Affiliates of Foreign
Firms (33.4% or more foreign-owned), USAFF: U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Firms (10% or more foreign-owned)













workers, 1997Table 3.1 "Entry" and "exit" of domestically-owned and foreign-owned firms in the manufacturing sector
(number of firms; figures in parentheses are total sales in billion yen)
Total 13731 13536 195 13486 13250 236
(250000) (238000) (12200) (265000) (241000) (23700)
Firms that "exited" in 1994-2000 4207
(34044)
Breakdown of "exited" firms 4145 62
(31900) (2124)
Firms that "entered" in 1994-2000 3962
(32300)
Breakdown of "entered" firms 3889 73
(31000) (1221)
Firms that "stayed" in 1994-2000 9524 9524
(216000) (233000)
Breakdown of firms that "stayed"
"Stayed" as domestically-owned 9330 9330
(192200) (205700)
"Stayed" as foreign-owned 102 102
(6785) (8285)
Changed from domestically-owned  61 61
to foreign-owned (13800) (14100)
Changed from foreign-owned  31 31



















(A) Majority-owned by one
foreign firm
(B) 33.4% or more is owned
by foreigners
1 Foods 10968 68 39 65 11036
(99.38) (0.62) (100.00)
2 Textiles 6049 16 10 14 6065
(99.74) (0.26) (100.00)
3 Woods and furniture  2459 7 0 7 2466
(99.72) (0.28) (100.00)
4 Pulp and paper 3052 8 4 5 3060
(99.74) (0.26) (100.00)
5 Printing and publishing 5403 22 13 15 5425
(99.59) (0.41) (100.00)
6 Industrial chemicals and chemical fibers 2084 141 53 131 2225
(93.66) (6.34) (100.00)
7 Oils and paints 951 18 7 17 969
(98.14) (1.86) (100.00)
8 Drugs and medicines 1322 128 93 118 1450
(91.17) (8.83) (100.00)
9 Other chemical products 1657 159 86 141 1816
(91.24) (8.76) (100.00)
10 Petroleum and coal products 340 47 14 47 387
(87.86) (12.14) (100.00)
11 Plastic products 4512 53 19 44 4565
(98.84) (1.16) (100.00)
12 Rubber products 978 16 6 16 994
(98.39) (1.61) (100.00)
13 Ceramics 4070 29 11 24 4099
(99.29) (0.71) (100.00)
14 Iron and steel  2760 3 2 1 2763
(99.89) (0.11) (100.00)
15 Non-ferrous metals and products 2212 33 17 32 2245
(98.53) (1.47) (100.00)
16 Fabricated metal products 6862 16 11 10 6878
(99.77) (0.23) (100.00)
17 Metal working machinery 1815 12 3 10 1827
(99.34) (0.66) (100.00)
18 Special industry machinery 2767 37 22 27 2804
(98.68) (1.32) (100.00)
19 Office, service industry and household machines 1085 16 8 14 1101
(98.55) (1.45) (100.00)
20 Miscellaneous machinery and machine parts 5155 125 65 101 5280
(97.63) (2.37) (100.00)
21 Industrial electric apparatus 2798 21 3 19 2819
(99.26) (0.74) (100.00)
22 Household electric appliances 1180 13 6 10 1193
(98.91) (1.09) (100.00)
23 Communication equipment and related products 2086 24 4 23 2110
(98.86) (1.14) (100.00)
24 Electronic data processing machine and electronic equipment 1386 20 14 17 1406
(98.58) (1.42) (100.00)
25 Electronic communication equipment and related products 4745 80 49 72 4825
(98.34) (1.66) (100.00)
26 Miscellaneous electrical machinery and supplies 1411 38 25 35 1449
(97.38) (2.62) (100.00)
27 Motor vehicles 6247 85 28 76 6332
(98.66) (1.34) (100.00)
28 Miscellaneous transportation equipment 1529 29 2 29 1558
(98.14) (1.86) (100.00)
29 Precision instruments 2340 55 35 46 2395
(97.70) (2.30) (100.00)
30 Other manufacturing 2301 37 31 20 2338
(98.42) (1.58) (100.00)
Manufacturing 92524 1356 680 1186 93880
(98.56) (1.44) (100.00)
Table3.2.ɹDistribution of foreign-owned firms by industry: Pooled data for 1994–2000
Industry Number of domestic firms
Number of Foreign firms








-.5  0  .5 
tfp 
Domestic firms  Foreign-owned firms (majority-owned by 
one foreign firm)  Foreign-owned firms (33.4% or more is
owned by foreigners) 
The number of pooled observations is 93880. The horizontal axis denotes the log value of firms’ TFP level.   TFP level
0.0773 *** 0.0037 2.7577 *** 0.0065 *** 1.4956 ***
(18.35) (1.09) (4.00) (5.80) (9.79)
_cons -0.0524 *** 0.0025 *** 8.5831 *** 0.0038 *** 0.6475 ***
(-21.29) (3.03) (51.93) (20.53) (18.76)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy*Year dummy yes no no no no
No. of observations 93880 70332 93880 93880 93880
0.0192 *** -0.0230 ** 1.2754 *** 0.0003 16.2696 *** 0.0121
(6.36) (-2.00) (18.52) (0.03) (7.91) (1.17)
_cons 0.0169 *** 0.0477511 *** 3.4736 *** -0.0042 ** 31.9526 *** 0.0379 ***
(20.13) (12.79) (178.78) (-2.13) (73.06) (17.51)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 93880 70332 93880 70332 93880 70332
Notes) 1.Pooled data for 1994-2000 are used.
        2. The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
        3.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).

Foreign-ownership dummy (majority-




owned by one foreign firm)
Current profit-
sales ratio (%)
















Capital-labor ratio R&D-sales ratio
(%)0.0809 *** 0.0064 *** 5.7805 *** 0.0073 *** 2.1479 ***
(27.92) (2.82) (8.53) (8.44) (15.40)
_cons -0.0525 *** 0.0024 *** 8.5550 *** 0.0037 *** 0.6392 ***
(-21.33) (2.99) (51.76) (20.41) (18.52)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy*Year dummy yes no no no no




0.0244 *** -0.0090 1.3031 *** -0.0061 25.17698 *** 0.0089
(11.78) (-1.01) (25.39) (-1.21) (11.41) (1.32)
_cons 0.0168 *** 0.0478 *** 3.4702 *** -0.0042 ** 31.8494 *** 0.0379 ***
(20.04) (12.79) (178.77) (-2.11) (72.08) (17.49)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 93880 70332 93880 70332 93880 70332
Notes) 1. Pooled data for 1994-2000 are used.
        2. The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
        3.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
        4. The industry dummy corresponding to the electronic data processing machine and electronic equipment industry is omitted.
       5. The year dummy corresponding to year 1994 is omitted.
Foreign-ownership dummy (33.4%




or more is owned by foreigners)
Current profit-
sales ratio (%)
Growth  rate of
real assets



























TFP level 93880 -0.0216 0.1022 -0.4905 0.5076
Growth rate of TFP 70332 0.0058 0.0634 -0.5430 0.6132
R&D investment-sales ratio 93880 0.0086 0.0202 0.0000 1.6391
No. of years passed since established 93880 36.6372 15.0046 0.0000 110.0000
(No. of years passed since established)^2 93880 1567.42 1159.86 0.0000 12100.00
Outsourcing ratio 93880 0.1071 0.1496 0.0000 9.8890
ln(Sales) 93880 8.4190 1.2958 4.8255 16.0220
(ln(Sales))^2 93880 72.5595 23.7767 23.2855 256.7040
Share of non-production workers in total workers 93880 0.3315 0.2492 0.0000 1.0000Table 3.5 Estimation results: determinants of TFP level and TFP growth rate
Table 3.5a Dependent variable: TFP level
0.0521 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0031 0.0031
(18.43) (17.26) (0.96) (0.96)
0.0480 *** 0.0426 *** -0.0038 -0.0038
(11.73) (10.47) (-0.76) (-0.76)
0.0377 *** 0.0379 *** 0.0003 0.0003
(29.79) (29.88) (0.24) (0.24)
0.2067 *** 0.1518 *** 0.2107 *** 0.1556 *** -0.1208 *** -0.1208 *** -0.1207 *** -0.1207 ***
(7.02) (5.96) (7.07) (6.04) (-7.69) (-7.70) (-7.69) (-7.69)
-0.0007 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0007 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 ***
(-9.43) (-10.45) (-9.30) (-10.34) (3.44) (3.44) (3.45) (3.45)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(5.82) (6.37) (5.46) (6.04) (-2.11) (-2.11) (-2.12) (-2.12)
Outsourcing ratio 0.0087 *** 0.0064 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0060 *** -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030
(4.14) (3.14) (3.96) (2.96) (-1.58) (1.58) (-1.58) (-1.58)
ln(Sales) 0.1339 *** 0.1282 *** 0.1330 *** 0.1273 *** 0.2418 *** 0.2418 *** 0.2417 *** 0.2417 ***
(66.71) (63.96) (66.45) (63.71) (35.21) (35.20) (35.20) (35.19)
(ln(Sales))^2 -0.0056 *** -0.0053 *** -0.0055 *** -0.0053 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0073 ***
(-51.26) (-49.00) (-50.86) (-48.62) (-18.20) (-18.20) (-18.19) (-18.19)
Constant -0.7592 *** -0.7419 *** -0.7561 *** -0.7390 *** -1.5198 *** -1.5199 *** -1.5195 *** -1.5196 ***
(-80.81) (-79.25) (-80.65) (-79.10) (-50.53) (-50.53) (-50.52) (-50.52)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy*Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm dummy no no no no yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 93880 93880 93880 93880 93880 93880 93880 93880
Number of groups - - - - 19652 19652 19652 19652
Notes) 1.The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
           2.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Ratio of non-production workers
R&D investment-sales ratio
Foreign-ownership dummy
(33.4% or more is owned by
No. of years passed since
established
(No. of years passed since
established)^2
Foreign-ownership dummy
(majority-owned by one foreignTable 3.5 Estimation results: determinants of TFP level and TFP growth rate
Table 3.5b Dependent variable: TFP level
US firm dummy 0.0538 *** -0.0106 0.0258 *** 0.0036
(8.82) (-1.49) (8.25) (1.36)
European firm dummy 0.0470 *** 0.0002 0.0496 *** 0.0034
(7.84) (0.03) (8.03) (0.52)
Other country dummy 0.0144 0.0027 0.0537 *** 0.0035
(1.33) (0.24) (17.05) (0.98)
0.2103 *** -0.1205 *** 0.1995 *** -0.1211 ***
(7.06) (-7.68) (6.88) (-7.71)
-0.0007 *** 0.0004 *** -0.0007 *** 0.0004 ***
(-9.28) (3.44) (-9.29) (3.49)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 **
(5.44) (-2.11) (5.64) (-2.19)
Outsourcing ratio 0.0083 *** -0.0030 *** 0.0087 ** -0.0030
(3.98) (-1.59) (4.14) (-1.57)
ln(Sales) 0.1330 *** 0.2418 *** 0.1366 *** 0.2420 ***
(66.46) (35.21) (67.66) (35.21)
(ln(Sales))^2 -0.0055 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0057 *** -0.0074 ***
(-50.86) (-18.21) (-52.42) (-18.23)
Constant -0.7560 *** -1.5199 *** -0.7701 *** -1.5208 ***
(-80.66) (-50.53) (-81.61) (-50.52)
Industry dummy yes yes Industry dummy yes yes
Year dummy yes yes Year dummy yes yes
Firm dummy no yes Firm dummy no yes
Industry dummy*Year dummy yes yes Industry dummy*Year dumm yes yes
Number of observations 93880 93880 Number of observations 93880 63584
Number of groups - 19652 Number of groups - 93880
Notes) 1.The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
           2.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).









No. of years passed since
established
(No. of years passed since
established)^2





ConstantTable 3.5 Estimation results: determinants of TFP level and TFP growth rate
Table 3.5c Dependent variable: growth rate of TFP
lagged TFP level -0.2817 *** -0.2792 *** -0.2825 *** -0.2800 *** -0.8325 *** -0.8324 *** -0.8325 *** -0.8324 ***
(-86.60) (-86.52) (-86.69) (-86.62) (-223.08) (-222.94) (-223.08) (-222.94)
0.0145 *** 0.0155 *** -0.0072 -0.0076
(4.56) (4.92) (-1.15) (-1.21)
0.0173 *** 0.0180 *** 0.0027 0.0026
(8.10) (8.40) (0.71) (0.70)
0.0074 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0021 0.0021
(7.58) (7.52) (1.36) (1.37)
0.0234 * 0.0224 * -0.1276 *** -0.1278 ***
(1.81) (1.74) (-7.37) (-7.38)
-0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***
(-7.24) (-6.88) (-7.24) (-6.88) (4.72) (4.72) (4.71) (4.72)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(4.57) (4.37) (4.69) (4.49) (-3.09) (-3.07) (-3.08) (-3.06)
Outsourcing ratio -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0076 *** -0.0079 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0079 ***
(-0.41) (-0.17) (-0.31) (-0.06) (-3.36) (-3.46) (-3.36) (-3.46)
ln(Sales) 0.0421 *** 0.0426 *** 0.0425 *** 0.0431 *** 0.2369 *** 0.2361 *** 0.2369 *** 0.2361 ***
(27.92) (28.34) (28.14) (28.57) (29.16) (29.06) (29.16) (29.05)
(ln(Sales))^2 -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0063 *** -0.0063 *** -0.0063 *** -0.0063 ***
(-21.82) (-22.16) (-22.10) (-22.46) (-13.40) (-13.26) (-13.40) (-13.26)
Constant -0.2250 *** -0.2263 *** -0.2268 *** -0.2282 *** -1.5209 *** -1.5192 *** -1.5209 *** -1.5192 ***
(-31.16) (-31.34) (-31.36) (-31.56) (-42.13) (-42.06) (-42.13) (-42.06)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm dummy no no no no yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 70332 70332 70332 70332 70332 70332 70332 70332
Number of groups - - - - 16471 16471 16471 16471
Notes) 1.The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
           2.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Foreign-ownership dummy
(majority-owned by one foreign
Ratio of non-production workers
R&D investment-sales ratio
Foreign-ownership dummy
(33.4% or more is owned by
No. of years passed since
established
(No. of years passed since
established)^2Table 3.5 Estimation results: determinants of TFP level and TFP growth rate
Table 3.5.d Dependent variable: growth rate of TFP
lagged TFP level -0.2796 *** -0.8325 *** -0.2806 *** -0.8325 ***
(-86.53) (-223.07) (-86.68) (-223.08)
US dummy 0.0183 ** -0.0043 0.0089 *** 0.0046 *
(3.93) (-0.49) (4.05) (1.66)
European firm dummy 0.0147 *** -0.0097 0.0173 *** 0.0073
(3.21) (-1.12) (4.03) (1.05)
Other country dummy -0.0003 -0.0081 0.0184 *** 0.0019
(-0.03) (-0.52) (7.60) (0.45)
0.0335 ** -0.1275 *** 0.0297 ** -0.1281 ***
(2.54) (-7.36) (2.27) (7.40)
-0.0004 *** 0.0006 *** -0.0004 *** 0.0006 ***
(-6.92) (4.73) (-6.87) (4.78)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ***
(4.37) (-3.09) (4.42) (3.19)
Outsourcing ratio -0.0003 -0.0077 *** -0.0001 -0.0076 ***
(-0.17) (-3.38) (-0.07) (-3.35)
ln(Sales) 0.0429 *** 0.2370 *** 0.0444 *** 0.2374 ***
(28.41) (29.17) (28.78) (29.20)
(ln(Sales))^2 -0.0017 *** -0.0063 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0064 ***
(-22.27) (-13.41) (-22.83) (-13.47)
Constant -0.2271 *** -1.521 *** -0.2332 *** -1.5223 ***
(-31.40) (-42.11) (-31.72) (-42.14)
Industry dummy yes yes Industry dummy yes yes
Year dummy yes yes Year dummy yes yes
Firm dummy no yes Firm dummy no yes
Number of observations 70332 70332 Number of observations 70332 70332
Number of groups - 16471 Number of groups - 16471
Notes) 1.The values in parentheses are t-statistics.






No. of years passed since
established
No. of years passed since
established
(No. of years passed since
established)^2








R&D investment-sales ratio R&D investment-sales ratioTable 4.1 Number of out-in and in-in M&A cases
Foreign-ownership
dummy (33.4% or






1994–1995 7 12 228
1995–1996 5 6 218
1996–1997 13 14 291
1997–1998 63 9 169
1998–1999 29 5 177
1999–2000 9 11 119
2000–2001 17 10 160
Total 143 67 1362
Out-in M&A
In-in M&A1.466 0.956 1.053 1.930 1.525 1.542 -0.027 0.129 0.195
(3.93) *** (2.47) ** (2.22) ** (4.05) *** (3.28) *** (2.47) *** (-0.23) (1.05) (1.24)
-0.863 -0.172 -0.233
(-1.29) (-0.18) (-0.98)
0.082 0.085 0.094 0.006 0.007 0.042 -0.064 -0.055 -0.047
(3.16) *** (3.23) *** (3.20) *** (0.20) (0.23) (1.25) (-5.19) *** (-4.42) *** (-3.28) ***
1.631 1.576 1.250 1.836 -0.065 -0.058
(2.29) ** (1.97) ** (1.43) (1.74) * (-1.26) (-1.17)
-0.038 -0.065 -0.013 0.005 0.271 0.291
(-0.31) (-0.44) (-0.08) (0.03) (9.27) *** (8.37) ***
-3.901 -3.932 -4.457 -3.298 -3.336 -4.201 -1.680 -1.929 -2.046
(-16.19) *** (-14.97) *** (-13.22) *** (-12.21) *** (-10.33) *** (-9.52) *** (-21.82) *** (-23.28) *** (-21.22) ***
1. The values in parentheses are z-statistics.
2. *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).









TFP growth rate: ln(TFP)t-1-ln(TFP)t-2
-485.76 -484.40
Sample size 78167 78165 67242 67240
Log pseudo-likelihood





Industry dummy (30 industries) yes yes yes
Out-in M&A (based on 33.4% cut-off point) Out-in M&A (based on majority ownership by one foreign firm) In-in M&A














(2.30) ** (-0.44) (2.37) **
In-in M&A dummy 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
(1.78) * (1.75) * (0.56) (0.56) (0.54) (0.51)
ln(TFP)t-1 -0.316 -0.316 0.148 0.148 0.071 0.071
(-60.79) *** (-60.78) *** (8.27) *** (8.27) *** (4.31) *** (4.31) ***
ln(number of workers)t-1 0.007 0.007 -0.022 -0.022 -0.001 -0.001
(23.65) *** (23.67) *** (-27.98) *** (-28.00) *** (-3.35) *** (-3.34) ***
(Current Profit/Sales)t-1 -0.042 -0.042 0.111 0.111 -0.871 -0.871
(-2.30) ** (-2.30) ** (1.54) (1.54) (-10.67) *** (-10.67) ***
(R&D/sales)t-1 0.216 0.216 0.089 0.089 0.140 0.140
(9.66) *** (9.67) *** (1.99) ** (1.99) ** (7.92) *** (7.92) ***
-0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000
(-3.72) *** (-3.73) *** (2.36) ** (2.37) ** (-0.18) (-0.19)
(Total liability/total asset)t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 -0.038 -0.038
(-1.36) (-1.36) (-3.16) *** (-3.16) *** (-7.01) *** (-7.01) ***
(Sales/number of workers)t-1 0.000 0.000
(6.44) *** (6.44) ***
Constant term -0.026 -0.026 0.127 0.127 0.061 0.061
(-9.36) *** (-9.37) *** (15.20) *** (15.21) *** (8.09) *** (8.09) ***
Industry dummy (30 industries)
Year dummy
Sample size
1. The values in parentheses are t-statistics based on White's method.








Dummy for firms which do not report
R&D expenditure in t-1
Table 4.3 Dynamic effects of M&A: effects two years later
Change of (Current
profits/Sales): from t-1 to t+1
Out-in M&A dummy (based on
majority ownership by one foreign
TFP growth rate: ln(TFP)t+1-
ln(TFP)t-1
Growth rate of number of
workers: from t-1 to t+1
Out-in M&A dummy (based on
33.4% cut-off point)Dependent variable
0.017 -0.001 0.008
(2.05) ** (-0.05) (1.16)
0.018 -0.032 0.016
(1.66) * (-0.64) (1.90) *
In-in M&A dummy 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.000 0.000  
(3.59) *** (3.59) *** (1.81) * (1.84) * (0.08) (0.05)
ln(TFP)t-1 -0.369 -0.369 0.189  0.189 0.063 0.063
(-72.08) *** (-72.08) *** (8.72) *** (8.73) *** (4.76) *** (4.76) ***
ln(number of workers)t-1 0.009 0.009 -0.030   -0.030 -0.001 -0.001
(24.71) *** (24.73) *** (-29.28) *** (-29.29) *** (-3.08) *** (-3.07) ***
(Current Profit/Sales)t-1 -0.031 -0.031 0.119 0.119 -0.903 -0.903
(-2.64) *** (-2.64) *** (1.41) (1.41) (-13.64) *** (-13.64) ***
(R&D/sales)t-1 0.238 0.238 0.220 0.220 0.128 0.128
(7.81) *** (7.81) *** (3.32) *** (3.33) *** (6.30) *** (6.29) ***
-0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.48) *** (-3.49) *** (4.08) *** (4.08) *** (-0.92) (-0.92)
(Total liability/total asset)t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.020 -0.019 -0.038 -0.038
(-0.23) (-0.25) (-3.17) *** (-3.17) *** (-7.05) *** (-7.05) ***
(Sales/number of workers)t-1 0.000 0.000
(6.18) *** (6.44) ***
Constant term -0.051 -0.051 0.178 0.178 0.060 0.060
(-17.30) *** (-17.32) *** (17.11) *** (17.11) *** (9.14) *** (9.14) ***
Industry dummy (30 industries)
Year dummy
Sample size
1. The values in parentheses are t-statistics based on White's method.




Out-in M&A dummy (based on 33.4% cut-off point)
Out-in M&A dummy (based on majority ownership by
one foreign firm)
Dummy for firms which do not report R&D expenditure
in t-1
yes
Table 4.4 Dynamic effects of M&A: effects three years later
TFP growth rate: ln(TFP)t+2-ln(TFP)t-1
Growth rate of number of workers: from t-1 to
t+2
Change of (Current Profit/Sales): from t-1 to t+2